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[1] There should be little question that mobile device-based data are 
discoverable if relevant.  However, as was the case with ordinary 
computer-based data a decade or more ago, there is a tendency to believe 
that there is only one way to collect such data—“forensically.”1  This 
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1
 Indeed, there is confusion even about what the term “forensic” means.  Some 
distinguish between a “forensic image” and a “forensic copy” or “forensically sound” 
collections.  A forensic image refers to a “bit-for-bit copy of the data that exists on the 
original media, without any additions or deletions.”  Ovie L. Carroll, Stephan K. Brannon 
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article will demonstrate that there are a number of potentially reasonable 
ways to collect mobile device data, and that the choice depends, as it does 
for any other type of information, on the facts and circumstances of the 
case.  We will first examine the proliferation and impact of mobile data.  
Then, we will survey the case law demonstrating both that mobile data are 
relevant and that the principle of reasonableness applies to mobile data as 
it does to any other source.  Next, we will outline the various methods for 
collecting mobile data, any of which might be reasonable under given 
circumstances.  Finally, we will consider other complicating factors that 
will impact the decision about what type of collection is appropriate under 
the circumstances of a give case. 
 
I.  PREVALENCE AND RELEVANCE OF MOBILE DATA 
 
[2] It goes without saying that mobile devices are ubiquitous.  
Research by the Pew Research Center shows that: 
 
 90% of American adults have a cell phone 
                                                                                                                         
& Thomas Song, Computer Forensics: Digital Forensic Analysis Methodology, U. S. 
ATTYS’ BULL., Jan. 2008, at 1, 2, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5601.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/D7ZG-E9UJ.  In other words, every data element on the source media is 
collected, including program files, system files, fragmented files, and even blank disk 
space.  See R. Lance Fogarty & Gregory Ledenbach, Deleted Computer Data Uncovered, 
THE TEX. INVESTIGATOR, Spring 2009, at 22, 25, available at 
http://www.protegga.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Tali-Article.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XS8E-78J5.  The terms “forensic copy” and “forensically sound” 
generally refer to a targeted, file-level collection that does not include such things as 
fragmented data.  See Thomas Lidbury & Michael Boland, Technology: Forensically 
Sound Collection of ESI, INSIDE COUNSEL (May 11, 2012), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/05/11/technology-forensically-sound-collection-of-
esi, archived at http://perma.cc/65QY-WCAE.  In reality, any type of information 
gathering for litigation purposes is “forensic” according to the definition of the term: 
“pertaining to, connected with, or used in courts of law or public discussion and debate.”  
Forensic, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/forensic?s=t , 
archived at http://perma.cc/63Q8-9TCZ (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
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 58% of American adults have a smartphone 
 32% of American adults own an e-reader 
 42% of American adults own a tablet computer2 
 
[3] These data represent a 37% increase in cell phone ownership since 
2000, and a 23% increase in smartphone ownership in less than three 
years.
3
   
 
[4] The proliferation of mobile devices is not limited to personal use 
and does not only affect individuals.  Indeed, business use of mobile 
devices is more complex due to the trend towards “bring your own device” 
(“BYOD”) policies, which either allow or require employees to provide 
their own mobile devices for work use.
4
  The obvious result is that 
employees’ mobile devices will contain a larger mix of personal and 
business data, with the corollary result that companies will have to 
produce more information from a wider variety of mobile devices.
5
  In a 
survey conducted by Norton Rose Fulbright, 41% of the responding 
companies had to preserve or collect data from employees’ mobile devices 
in support of litigation or investigations, an increase of more than 10% in 
                                                 
2
 Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CENTER INTERNET PROJECT, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8QTP-RD7K (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 
3
 See Device Ownership Over Time, PEW RES. CENTER INTERNET PROJECT, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/mobile/device-ownership/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EVM3-Y74K (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 
4
 See, e.g., Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Predicts by 2017, Half of Employers will 
Require Employees to Supply Their Own Device for Work Purposes (May 1, 2013), 
available at http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2466615, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4Z5N-C8DH. 
 
5
 See, e.g., Mobile Device Analytics: Getting Smart About Smartphones, DELOITTE 
(2013), available at http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Document 
s/finance/us-fas-mobile-device-discovery-and-investigations-08162013.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2GG6-3688. 
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two years.
6
  Indeed, in a recent survey by BDO Consulting, “the largest 
percentage of in-house counsel (22.5 percent) say managing mobile and 
social networking data is the number one issue they will face in the near 
future[.]” 7   Not surprisingly, then, mobile devices are becoming 
increasingly important sources of potentially relevant information.   
 
[5] There was, perhaps, a time when attorneys could legitimately 
overlook data on mobile devices in some cases.  When Blackberry devices 
dominated the market, and were generally synched to enterprise servers, 
there was little reason to believe that potentially relevant data existed on 
the mobile device that was not available from a more accessible source.
8
  
That has changed.  First, there is a wide variety of information on mobile 
devices that is likely not available anywhere else.  Types of data available 
on a smartphone or tablet include: 
 
 E-mail 
 Text messages 
 Voicemail messages 
 User information stored as mini-databases or structured 
text files (e.g., address books, call history, favorite 
telephone numbers, browser history, bookmarks, recent 
Internet searches, cookies) 
 Photographs 
 Video recordings 
 Voice recordings 
                                                 
6
 NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY REPORT 35 (2014), available 
at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/115045/norton-rose-
fulbrights-10th-annual-litigation-trends, archived at http://perma.cc/CN9L-TB7L. 
 
7
 BDO CONSULTING, INAUGURALINSIDE E-DISCOVERY SURVEY 3 (2014), available at 
https://www.bdo.com/getattachment/af620fbc-e3c4-46b9-a642-
e9332eab5692/attachment.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/6U4X-CY7U. 
 
8
 See, e.g., Charlie Hiphop, Why the NSA Doesn’t Want You to Have a Blackberry, 
CANTECH LETTER (July 23, 2013), http://www.cantechletter.com/2013/07/why-the-nsa-
doesnt-want-you-to-have-a-blackberry0723/, archived at http://perma.cc/CZ6Q-V4DJ. 
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 Notes 
 GPS data (which may be attached to other files, such as 
photographs) 
 Maps and navigation history 
 Wi-fi and cellular location history9 
 
[6] Second, the data on a mobile device may be quite relevant even in 
routine litigation.  Consider just two common scenarios, starting with 
routine vehicle accidents.  The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) reports that in 2012 alone, 3,328 people were 
killed and approximately 421,000 people were injured in accidents 
involving distracted driving.
10
  Current research confirms that the risk of 
accidents increases significantly with the use of mobile devices while 
driving.
11
  Further, an estimated 9% of all drivers do so while using a cell 
phone or sending and receiving text messages.
12
  Driver conduct is an 
issue in just about every automobile accident case, and mobile devices are 
increasingly becoming a key source of evidence on that issue.
13
 
  
                                                 
9
 See Michael Arnold, Column, Collecting Data from Mobile Devices, 40 LITIG. 53, 54–
55 (2013). 
 
10
 Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Distracted Driving: Facts and Statistics, 
DISTRACTION.GOV, http://www.distraction.gov/get-the-facts/facts-and-statistics.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/A8BE-G6X8 (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 
11
 See, e.g., Sheila G. Klauer et al., Distracted Driving and Risk of Road Crashes Among 
Novice and Experienced Drivers, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 54, 57 (2014), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1204142, archived at 
http://perma.cc/PT4V-24L7 (showing that dialing, reaching for, or using a cell phone to 
send or receive text messages increased the odds of an accident by as much as eight 
times). 
 
12
 See id. at 55.  
 
13
 See id. 
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[7] On the business side of litigation, mobile devices are no less 
important.  Some estimates indicate that there has been a 43% increase in 
the use of instant messaging through mobile devices as a way employees 
conduct business.
14
  Unlike e-mail and voicemail, text messages are 
generally not duplicative of data that can be found on the company’s 
network.
15
  Whether the case involves allegations of employment 
discrimination or product liability, individual employees implicated in the 
litigation are increasingly likely to have potentially relevant information 
on mobile devices that can be found nowhere else. 
 
A.  Emerging Case Law Involving Mobile Data 
 
[8] A number of recent cases have directly addressed mobile data, 
typically in the context of spoliation.  For example, Calderon v. 
Corporacion Puertorrique a de Salud was a sexual harassment case in 
which the plaintiff selectively retained messages on his cell phone.
16
  
Records from the plaintiff’s mobile service provider indicated that 
plaintiff failed to produce more than thirty-eight text messages sent from 
the account of the alleged harasser.
17
  The court held that the plaintiff’s 
“decision not to forward or save the unproduced texts and photos from 
prpng@hotmail.com constitutes ‘conscious abandonment of potentially 
useful evidence’ that indicates that he believed those records would not 
help his side of the case.”18  The court determined that plaintiff’s failure to 
                                                 
14
 See, e.g., OMG—Is This the End for Texting?, CNBC (Feb. 21, 2014, 4:10 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101406820#, archived at http://perma.cc/W7SB-KE4H. 
 
15
 See, e.g., Tom Kaneshige, Think Deleted Text Messages Are Gone Forever?  Think 
Again, CIO (Mar. 11, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.cio.com/article/2378005/byod/byod-
think-deleted-text-messages-are-gone-forever-think-again.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2WRD-3M4E. 
 
16
 See Calderon v. Corporacion Puertorriquena De La Salud, 992 F. Supp. 2d 48, 51–52 
(D. P.R. 2014).  
  
17
 See id. at 52–53. 
 
18
 Id. at 52. 
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preserve the text messages “severely prejudice[d]” the defendants, 
requiring an adverse inference instruction at trial.
19
 
 
[9] In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Products Liability Litigation 
concerned a nationwide multi-district litigation (MDL) in which the 
plaintiffs moved for sanctions for spoliation of, among other things, 
business-related text messages.
20
  After noting that the duty to preserve for 
each of the two defendants arose in February and April, 2012, 
respectively, the court went on to severely chastise the defendants for 
failing to institute a legal hold specifically identifying text messaging until 
October, 2013, even though the plaintiffs had specifically requested text 
messages in its initial discovery requests, and the defendants’ own 
documents showed that they “directed their sales force to use texts to 
communicate with their supervisors, district managers, and others.”21  In 
fact, despite that “[i]t is certainly common knowledge that texting has 
become the preferred means of communication,” the defendants failed to 
suspend the auto-deletion of text messages on company issued and 
programmed cell phones.
22
  The court ordered the immediate production 
of any relevant text messages, reserving the right to impose sanctions if 
the data were not available.
23
 
                                                 
19
 Id. at 53. 
 
20
 In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2385, 3:12-md-
02385-DRH-SCW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173674, at *56–58 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2013). 
 
21
 Id. at *56–57. 
 
22
 See id. at *62–63, *65. 
 
23
 Id. at *68; see also Freres v. Xyngular Corp., No. 2:13-cv-400-DAK-PMW, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 44116 at *14 (D. Utah Mar. 31, 2014) (ordering production of plaintiffs’ cell 
phone for inspection and copying); Bailey v. Scoutware, LLC, No. 12-10281, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 37197, at *17–18 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014) (allowing forensic inspection 
of cell phone by plaintiffs’ expert in an attempt to identify allegedly missing text and 
voicemail messages); Christou v. Beatport, LLC, No. 10-cv-02912-RBJ-KMT, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9034, at *37–39 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2013) (issuing sanctions where 
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[10] Lastly, EEOC v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Georgia 
involved the defendant’s motion to compel a wide variety of information 
from the class representatives in this sexual harassment, hostile 
environment and retaliation case.
24
  Based on information discovered on 
one class representative’s Facebook page, the defendant sought production 
of social media content, text messages, e-mail and other electronically 
stored information relevant to the plaintiffs’ alleged damages, as well as 
their credibility and bias.
25
  The court first found that the types of 
information sought were no different than any other discoverable 
information: 
 
As a general matter, I view this content logically as though 
each class member had a file folder titled “Everything 
About Me,” which they have voluntarily shared with 
others.  If there are documents in this folder that contain 
information that is relevant or may lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence relating to this lawsuit, the 
presumption is that it should be produced.  The fact that it 
exists in cyberspace on an electronic device is a logistical 
and, perhaps, financial problem, but not a circumstance that 
removes the information from accessibility by a party 
opponent in litigation.
26
 
                                                                                                                         
defendants took no steps to preserve the text messages on an iPhone that was 
subsequently lost). 
 
24
 See EEOC v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co., No. 11-cv-02560-MSK-MEH, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 160285, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012). 
 
25
 See id. at *7–8. 
 
26
 Id. at *3–4. 
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After determining that the requested information was, in fact, potentially 
relevant, the court ordered its production.
27
  To protect the individual 
plaintiffs’ privacy interests, the court appointed a special master to retrieve 
all of the data, including text messages on the plaintiffs’ cell phones, and 
submit information believed to be relevant for in camera inspection.
28
 
 
B.  Case Law Regarding Collection Methods 
 
[11] As demonstrated above, data on mobile devices will often be 
relevant and, therefore, subject to preservation and possibly collection.  
The legal standards applicable to the method chosen to collect that data, 
however, are no different than the standards applicable to any other 
relevant information: “Whether preservation or discovery conduct is 
acceptable in a case depends on what is reasonable, and that in turn 
depends on whether what was done—or not done—was proportional to 
that case and consistent with clearly established applicable standards.”29  
The determination of whether discovery conduct was reasonable or not, 
“depends heavily on the facts and circumstances of each case and cannot 
be reduced to a generalized checklist of what is acceptable or 
unacceptable.”30   
  
                                                 
27
 See id. at *7–8. 
 
28
 See id. 
 
29
 Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
19, 2010). 
 
30
 Id.; see also Stanley v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. Sept. 9, 2010); 
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: SECOND EDITION BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION 28 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE SEDONA 
PRINCIPLES], available at 
http://www.sos.mt.gov/Records/committees/erim_resources/A%20-
%20Sedona%20Principles%20Second%20Edition.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9HGB-C3YE. 
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[12] In Nola Spice Designs, LLC v. Haydel Enterprises, the court 
addressed the propriety and necessity of forensic images.
31
  In that 
trademark infringement case, the plaintiff sought an order compelling the 
defendants to, among other things, “submit their computers to an 
exhaustive forensic examination . . .”32  The court rejected the plaintiff’s 
request because it “far exceed[ed] the proportionality limits imposed by 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)—expressly made applicable to ESI by Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) . . .”33  The court explained:   
 
[Plaintiff’s] request for an exhaustive forensic examination 
of [defendants’] computers is within the scope of ESI 
discovery contemplated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A).  At 
the same time, however, such requests are also subject to 
the proportionality limitations applicable to all discovery 
under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), including the prohibition of 
discovery that is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or 
that could be obtained from some more convenient, less 
burdensome or less expensive source, or the benefit of 
which is outweighed by its burden or expense, when 
considering the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
issues at stake and the importance of the proposed 
discovery to those issues.  Certainly, the Official Advisory 
Committee Notes to the 2006 Amendments to Rule 34 
relating to electronic discovery of the type sought by 
Haydel counsel caution: 
 
“As with any other form of discovery, issues of burden and 
intrusiveness raised by requests to test . . . can be addressed 
                                                 
31
 See Nola Spice Designs, LLC v. Haydel Enters., No. 12-2515, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108872, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2013). 
 
32
 Id. at *2–3. 
 
33
 Id. at *3. 
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under Rules 26(b)(2) and 26(c).  Inspection or testing of 
certain types of electronically stored information or of a 
responding party’s electronic information system may raise 
issues of confidentiality or privacy.  The addition of testing 
and sampling to Rule 34(a) with regard to . . . electronically 
stored information is not meant to create a routine right of 
direct access to a party’s electronic information system, 
although such access might be justified in some 
circumstances.  Courts should guard against undue 
intrusiveness resulting from inspecting or testing such 
systems.”34 
 
[13] Indeed, although  
 
[F]orensic computer examinations of the type sought by 
[plaintiff] in this motion are ‘not uncommon in the course 
of civil discovery, . . . “[c]ourts have been cautious in 
requiring the mirror imaging of computers where the 
request is extremely broad in nature and the connection 
between the computers and the claims in the lawsuit are 
unduly vague or unsubstantiated in nature.”35   
 
Courts have only granted motions to compel forensic examinations where 
“where the moving party has demonstrated that its opponent has defaulted 
in its discovery obligations by unwillingness or failure to produce relevant 
information by more conventional means.”36   
 
                                                 
34
 Id. at *3–6. 
 
35
 Id. at *6 (quoting John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 459-60 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 
36
 Nola Spice Designs, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108872, at *7.  
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[14] The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in 
John B. v. Goetz.
37
  This class action litigation spanning over 10 years 
involved implementation of the TennCare program in Tennessee.
38
  
During the course of the litigation, disputes arose about the scope of the 
defendants’ preservation and production of ESI.39  Following a series of 
hearing on motions to compel and reconsider, the district court entered an 
order allowing “plaintiffs’ computer expert to make forensic copies of the 
hard drives of identified computers, including not only those at the work 
stations of the state’s key custodians, but also any privately owned 
computers on which the custodians may have performed or received work 
relating to the TennCare program.”40  The defendants filed a motion for an 
emergency stay and a petition for mandamus, both of which the appellate 
court granted, finding that the district court’s order constituted an abuse of 
discretion.
41
  The court first acknowledged that a “party may choose on its 
own to preserve information through forensic imaging, and district courts 
have, for various reasons, compelled the forensic imaging and production 
of opposing parties' computers.”42  One the other hand, the court cautioned 
that: 
 
Civil litigation should not be approached as if information 
systems were crime scenes that justify forensic 
investigation at every opportunity to identify and preserve 
every detail. . . .  [M]aking forensic image backups of 
computers is only the first step of an expensive, complex, 
                                                 
37
 See John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 461 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 
38
 See id. at 451–52. 
 
39
 See id. at 451. 
 
40
 Id. at 451. 
 
41
 See id. at 456–59. 
 
42
 John B., 531 F.3d at 459. 
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and difficult process of data analysis that can divert 
litigation into side issues and satellite disputes involving 
the interpretation of potentially ambiguous forensic 
evidence.
43
 
 
The court found insufficient evidence in the record to suggest that the 
defendants intentionally deleted relevant information or were unwilling or 
unable to preserve and produce such information in the future.
44
  For this 
reason, and because the ordered forensic imaging implicated “significant 
privacy and confidentiality concerns,” the court granted the defendants’ 
petition and overturned the district court’s orders.45 
 
[15] Lee v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. involved a request for a forensic 
image of the plaintiff’s personal computer and iPhone.46  Lee was a class 
action lawsuit alleging that the defendant insurance company sent 
unauthorized text messages to prospective purchasers of its insurance 
products.
47
  During discovery, the defendants sought production of the 
named plaintiff’s personal computer and iPhone for the purpose of 
capturing a forensic image of each in an attempt to recover copies of any 
relevant text messages.
48
  The court denied the defendants’ motion.49  As 
                                                 
43
 Id. at 460 (quoting THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, at 34, 47. 
 
44
 See John B., 531 F.3d at 460. 
 
45
 Id. at 460–61. 
 
46
 See Lee v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., No. 11-cv-43 RS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
106654, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2013). 
 
47
 See Beth Winegarner, Stonebridge Settles Spam Text Case with 60K Plaintiffs, 
LAW360, http://www.law360.com/articles/524843/stonebridge-settles-spam-text-case-
with-60k-plaintiffs, archived at http://perma.cc/3862-H4M6 (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 
48
 See Lee, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106654, at *2. 
 
49
 See id. at *7–8. 
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in Goetz, the court first acknowledged that Rule 34 permits parties to seek 
inspection and testing of “data or data compilations . . . stored in any 
medium.”50  Nevertheless, the court held that the defendants “failed to 
demonstrate sufficient good cause to warrant the extreme step of allowing 
it to conduct a forensic inspection of Plaintiff’s iPhone and personal 
computer.”51  The court noted that a backup of the iPhone at issue was 
available on the plaintiff’s personal computer, that the plaintiff had 
already agreed to search for and produce any relevant information stored 
on her personal computer, and emphasized that there was no evidence of 
wrongdoing by the plaintiff: “absent a showing of misconduct on 
Plaintiff’s part such that serious questions exist as to the reliability and the 
completeness of Plaintiff’s expert’s search, [the defendant] is not entitled 
to a forensic examination of Plaintiff’s personal computer.”52 
 
[16] In contrast, Olney v. Job.Com is a good example of a case in which 
forensic images were critical to the court’s decision.53  Olney was a class 
action alleging that the defendants made unsolicited calls to the named 
plaintiff’s cell phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act.
54
  The defendants requested access to the cell phone and computer the 
plaintiff alleged were involved in the communications between the 
plaintiff and the defendants, and the court ultimately ordered the plaintiff 
                                                 
50
 Id. at *2–3 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A)). 
 
51
 Id. at *4. 
 
52
 Id. at *4–5, *7; see also Bradfield v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. 5:13-cv-222-Oc-
10PRL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128677, at *11–12, *14–15 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2014) 
(denying request for forensic inspection of plaintiff’s counsel’s computer where there 
was no evidence that the information sought was not available from some other source, 
the “particular information sought [was] known to actually exist,” and there was no 
evidence that information had been wrongfully withheld). 
 
53
 See Olney v. Job.com, No. 1:12-cv-01724-LJO-SKO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152140, 
at *67 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2014). 
 
54
 See id. at *6–7. 
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to deliver both to a neutral expert for imaging.
55
  In a very detailed 
opinion, the court reviewed the analyses by competing experts of the 
plaintiff’s personal computer to determine whether the plaintiff had 
deleted relevant information, either intentionally or negligently.
56
  The 
court ultimately determined that the plaintiff had in fact engaged in 
conduct that was, at various points in the litigation, negligent, grossly 
negligent, and willful, justifying an adverse inference instruction and 
monetary sanctions.
57
  
 
[17] The Olney opinion is instructive for a number of reasons.  First, it 
involves a situation that exemplifies the need for forensic imaging and 
analysis: where there are allegations that specific information has been 
deleted.  Second, it illustrates the complexity and potentially high cost of 
forensic analysis.  Here, the parties agreed on a neutral expert to image 
and analyze the data from the plaintiffs’ computer. 58   Apparently 
unsatisfied with the results of that analysis, each of the parties then 
obtained permission to retain their own experts to perform independent 
analyses.
59
  These experts proceeded to generate reports, supplemental 
reports, rebuttal reports, and supplemental declarations, to the point where 
the court finally declined to consider the last submissions, as “[r]ebuttal 
expert reports [would be] potentially endless in this circumstance[.]”60  
Finally, the court notes that the plaintiff “retained experienced class-action 
counsel with three law firms who should have known his computer could 
contain potentially relevant information,” leaving the plaintiff with little 
                                                 
55
 See id. at *7–8. 
 
56
 See id. at *9–26. 
 
57
 See id. at *30–34, *36–42. 
 
58
 Olney, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152140, at *8. 
 
59
 See id. at *10. 
 
60
 Id. at *24–27. 
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excuse for not preserving data on his computer.
61
  This underscores the 
fact that adequate preservation steps will typically obviate the need for 
forensic collection and analysis. 
 
[18] Finally, Ackerman v. PNC Bank demonstrates that sometimes the 
simplest collection method is adequate to the needs of the case
 
.
62
  In her 
appeal from the magistrate judge’s order denying her motion to compel 
discovery and for sanctions, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had 
“inadequately gathered electronically stored information (‘ESI’) or 
unlawfully destroyed ESI,” and “violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E) by 
producing hard copy ESI documents without the underlying metadata.”63  
The court disagreed, noting on the latter point that: 
 
Rule 34(b)(2)(E) does not specifically reference the 
production of metadata, but refers to a party’s obligation to 
produce documents as they are kept “in the usual course of 
business” or organized and labeled according to 
corresponding discovery request categories.  If the 
discovery request does not specify the form for producing 
ESI, Rule 34 requires a party to produce it in the form “in 
which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable 
form or forms.”64   
 
It is readily apparent that the case law does not require a specific 
collection method or form of production for any type of information, 
including mobile data.  Rather, the collection method should be reasonable 
                                                 
61
 Id. at *32. 
 
62
 See Ackerman v. PNC Bank, No. 12-CV-42 (SRN/JSM), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8301, 
at *5–7 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2014). 
 
63
 Id. at *2, *5–6. 
 
64
 Id. at *6 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i)–(ii)).  
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and appropriate for the circumstances of the case.   
 
II.  DEFENSIBLE MOBILE DATA COLLECTION OPTIONS 
 
[19] Having made the determination that information contained on 
mobile devices is potentially relevant, attorneys must then determine 
whether to collect the data, and if so, how.  In making these decisions, 
there are many factors to consider, including the complexity and cost of 
the collection relative to the issues at stake in the litigation.  Here, we will 
first survey the available collection methods and discuss the circumstances 
under which each might be appropriate.  Later in this article, we will also 
discuss some of the challenges and complicating factors associated with 
mobile data collection. 
 
 A.  No Collection 
 
[20] Sometimes, not collecting mobile data is a perfectly reasonable 
option.  For example, if the only data that are potentially relevant to the 
matter are e-mails, and the company has implemented an insulating 
technology to secure communications on the mobile device and ensure 
that all business-related e-mails are synchronized with the enterprise e-
mail server, then collecting from the mobile device would yield only 
duplicate data.
65
  
 
[21] Occasionally, all that is needed with respect to mobile data are call 
and text logs, and in most cases this information can be obtained via 
provider bills or specific detail requests that do not require the device 
itself.
66
  While the content of text messages is not shown on bills or 
                                                 
65
 See ESI & Data Hosting, DLSDISCOVERY, 
http://www.dlsdiscovery.net/esi_data_hosting.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D2V2-
2ZEH (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
 
66
 See, e.g., Billing and Payments, Understanding the Bill, VERIZON, 
http://www.verizonwireless.com/support/view-bill-online-faqs/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/VCQ9-ZCEK (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
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generally available without collection from the device, these types of call 
and text logs are not easily erased by an owner or user and benefit from 
having an impartial timestamp for time sensitive events such as might be 
required in a distracted driving case.
67
  Cellular providers can also provide 
cellular tower triangulation data that can identify the approximate location 
of a mobile device at a given time.
68
 
 
 B.  Hard Copy Collection 
 
[22] As odd as it might seem, paper may sometimes be a defensible 
form of collecting mobile data.  Most modern mobile devices are equipped 
with applications that enable wireless printing from the device.
69
  In some 
cases, where metadata are not of interest or at issue, the parties may be 
perfectly satisfied with paper copies of e-mails, text messages, or other 
content on a mobile device.
70
  Simply because it is possible to collect ESI 
from mobile devices does not mean that it is necessary in every case. 
 
 C.  Mobile Device Collection 
 
[23] There are essentially three methods of collecting data from a 
mobile device: file level collection, logical collection, and physical 
                                                 
67
 See id. 
 
68
 See Cell Phone Tower Triangulation, INT’L INVESTIGATORS INCORPORATED, 
http://www.iiiweb.net/forensic-services/cell-phone-tower-triangulation/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/49AP-TPMP (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
 
69
 See, e.g., Christopher Null, Mobile Printing: A Guide for the BYOD World, PCWORLD 
(Sept. 16, 2013, 3:01 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2048634/mobile-printing-a-
guide-for-the-byod-world.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3V9E-AMYU. 
 
70
 See Mark Lenetsky, eDiscovery: Collection of Text Messages, ADAPTABLE 
TECHNOLOGIES LLC, http://adaptable-tech.com/ediscovery-r-link/ediscovery-collection-
of-text-messages/, archived at http://perma.cc/GW7P-XSEM (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
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collection.
71
 
 
  1.  File Level Collection 
 
[24] The simplest method of collecting data from a mobile device is to 
essentially treat it as an external hard drive.  File level collections focus on 
active data that can be readily accessed through the device’s operating 
system, the operating system of a partner device (such as a connected 
computer), or via third party software.
72
  This is similar in nature to 
collecting the active files on a computer, which are the files that can be 
identified using the computer’s operating system, such as Windows.73  
 
[25] Depending on the needs of the case, and particularly on the 
importance of preserving metadata associated with the target files, an 
active file collection can be accomplished as simply as connecting the 
device to a partner computer as a USB storage device (external hard 
drive), and using the computer’s operating system to navigate to the target 
files and copying them to the computer.
74
  It is important to note that this 
method has the highest risk of altering both metadata of the files and the 
state of the mobile device should a physical image potentially be required 
                                                 
71
 See CINDY MURPHY, CELLULAR PHONE EVIDENCE: DATA EXTRACTION AND 
DOCUMENTATION, available at https://mobileforensics.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/cell-
phone-evidence-extraction-process-development-1-1-8.pdf, archived at 
https://perma.cc/NWN6-A6JX. 
 
72
 See id.  
 
73
 See Paul Henry, Quick Look—Cellebrite UFED Using Extract Phone Data & File 
System Dump, SANS DIGITAL FORENSICS & INCIDENT RESPONSE (Sept. 22, 2010, 6:16 
PM), http://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2010/09/22/digital-forensics-quick-cellebrite-
ufed-extract-phone-data-file-system-dump/, archived at http://perma.cc/CB63-6XNC. 
 
74
 See TIM PROFFITT, FORENSIC ANALYSIS ON IOS DEVICES 3–4, 6–9 (2012), available at 
http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-analysis-ios-devices-
34092/ forensic-analysis-ios-devices-34092 (1).pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4PL3-
9T5E. 
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in the future.
75
  On the other hand, steps can be taken to mitigate any 
alteration of the files on the device or to the metadata of the files 
collected.
76
  Usually a USB write-blocker can be used to preserve the 
device, but not all devices will communicate with the collections computer 
with such a device installed.
77
 
 
[26] Where metadata may be at issue or will be important for other 
reasons (such as culling and filtering), commercial software such as 
Access Data’s FTK Imager, Pinpoint Labs Safecopy or Wide Angle’s 
TouchCopy can be used to ensure that the metadata on both the mobile 
device and the collection drive are not altered as part of the collection.
78
  
Manual file copy collections are the most limited in what they can collect, 
as most devices that are not rooted or jail-broken
79
 will limit the accessible 
areas on the device to maintain application security.
80
 
 
[27] Situations where file level collection might be appropriate include 
                                                 
75
 See id. at 10–11. 
 
76
 See Write Blockers, FORENSICS WIKI, 
http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Write_Blockers, archived at http://perma.cc/6VXA-
9C5L (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 
77
 See id. 
 
78
 See, e.g., Data Acquisition & Preservation, ACCESS DATA, 
http://accessdata.com/services/digital-forensics/data-aquisition-preservation, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3EPB-JZHA (last visited Mar. 6, 2015); SAFECOPY, PINPOINT LABS, 
http://pinpointlabs.com/sc2.html, archived at http://perma.cc/38QX-NDNY (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2015); TOUCHCOPY, WIDE ANGLE SOFTWARE, 
http://www.wideanglesoftware.com/touchcopy/index.php, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7JBL-GRNJ (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 
79
 See, e.g., Mary McMahon, What Is a Jailbroken Phone?, WISEGEEK, 
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-jailbroken-phone.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6ZHX-LR6B (last modified Feb. 15, 2015). 
  
80
 See id. 
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cases where there are no relevant call/messaging logs, and a user has 
identified a few select files on their mobile device that may need to be 
collected.
81
  File level collection is far superior to having the user e-mail 
the file to a person collecting the data, such as an IT person, counsel or in-
house legal representative, because the latter method creates yet another 
copy of the file that should be preserved or collected.
82
  Some devices can 
be plugged directly into a prepared collection system and accessed just 
like a portable hard drive and the files exposed for collection.
83
 
 
  2.  Forensic Logical Copy 
 
[28] A forensic logical copy involves connecting the mobile device to 
tools or equipment and copying either everything or selected files from the 
device or any installed memory devices.
84
  During a logical collection, 
certain data such as pictures, music, e-mail, text messages and other files 
are copied with tools like FTK imager, Cellebrite and others to other 
media to be processed, evaluated and reviewed.
85
  A logical collection 
does not copy or access anything that is not on the device and does not 
copy latent information such as slack-space from deleted files or certain 
protected areas of a phone unless that device has been modified (often 
referred to as hacked, rooted or jail broken).
86
  Logical images do not 
                                                 
81
 See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 71. 
 
82
 See, e.g., Henry, supra note 73. 
 
83
  See PROFFITT, supra note 74, at 9. 
 
84
 See id. 
 
85
 See David Ashfield, Mobile Device Forensics: Data Acquisition Types, CCL GROUP 
(May 19, 2014), http://www.cclgroupltd.com/mobile-device-forensics-data-acquisition-
types/, archived at http://perma.cc/C5RQ-FLW7. 
 
86
 See id. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                         Volume XXI, Issue 3 
 
22 
 
collect unsaved data from volatile memory (e.g. from RAM).
87
 
 
  3.  Logical Collection of Synchronized Data 
 
[29] When a mobile device is synchronized with another location, it 
may be reasonable to collect from that location as opposed to the device 
itself.  It will almost certainly be simpler and more cost effective.
88
  For 
example, when a mobile device management system (MDM) is 
implemented within a company, certain applications are installed, or 
devices are routinely connected to other systems, the devices may be 
configured to back up their data to one of several locations
89
, including:  
 
 • The cloud, 
 • A dedicated server, application host or file share, or 
 • A specific partner computer or device.90 
 
[30] Care must be taken to ensure that the synchronized location does 
                                                 
87
 See What Are Our Best Options for Collecting and Synchronizing GIS Field Data?, 
WEBMAPSOLUTIONS, http://www.webmapsolutions.com/what-are-our-best-options-for-
collecting-and-synchronizing-gis-field-data, archived at http://perma.cc/C8AK-QVW4 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
 
88
 See Vangie Beal, What Is Mobile Device Management (MDM)?, WEBOPEDIA, 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/M/mobile_device_management.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7FVM-2TZ7 (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 
89
 See Carla Schroder, 6 Data Backup Devices for Small Businesses, SMALL BUSINESS 
COMPUTING.COM (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.smallbusinesscomputing.com/biztools/6-
data-backup-devices-for-small-businesses.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6EVR-
GHSF; see also The Difference Between Cloud Hosting and Dedicated Servers and 
What’s Right for You, STEADFAST, http://www.steadfast.net/blog/index.php/cloud/he-
difference-between-cloud-hosting, archived at http://perma.cc/U82P-TVZ7 (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2015). 
 
90
 See, e.g., Rene Millman, Smartphones & Tablets Remotely Wiped in UK Police 
Custody, ITPro (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.itpro.co.uk/security/23273/smartphones-
tablets-remotely-wiped-in-uk-police-custody, archived at http://perma.cc/EH3U-5DCB. 
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not materially change between the identification and the actual collection 
of that source.
91
  One of the safest ways to ensure that a synchronized 
location does not change is to disable the synchronization feature of the 
mobile device by turning the device off, setting the device to airplane 
mode and/or not connecting the device to any partner computers, 
sometimes referred to as “docking.”92  Synchronized locations may also be 
affected or accessed by more than one device.  For instance, Gmail, 
Dropbox and Facebook are common examples of locations that may be 
connected to more than one device or be changed from a remote computer 
even after the intended device has been secured.
93
  Further, all data on a 
mobile device may not be in one central location requiring logical 
collections from multiple sources. 
 
[31] Importantly, if the synchronized data is in the form of a backup, 
the type, currency, and format of the data may vary significantly from 
what is on the mobile device and may require not only a forensic expert to 
review and analyze, but special software to decode the data.
94
  For 
                                                 
91
 See, e.g., Supreme Court Watch: Ten Key Issues from the Riley Opinion Protecting 
Cell Phone Data Seized During an Arrest, FED. EVIDENCE REV. (June 30, 2014), 
http://federalevidence.com/blog/2014/june/supreme-court-watch-cell-phone-content-
protected-under-fourth-amendment, archived at http://perma.cc/DR9P-NZ8P. 
 
92
 See, e.g., Computer Tips and Tricks, Gadgets, How-To, Life-2.0 Style, TECH BUZZ 
(Mar. 21, 2009), http://www.techbuzz.in/can-two-people-be-logged-into-the-same-
facebook-account-at-the-same-time.php, archived at http://perma.cc/ZDJ7-77C2; see also 
Remote Wipe Overview, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/en/help/4227, archived at 
https://perma.cc/743T-JMJJ (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 
93
 See, e.g., Create and Delete iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch Backups in iTunes, APPLE, 
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204269, archived at https://perma.cc/RT4L-HXU4 
(last visited Mar. 6. 2015). 
 
94
 See iCloud Security and Privacy Overview, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT202303, archived at https://perma.cc/FL7M-NQTV (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).  
Microsoft offers a similar service.  See Back up My Stuff, WINDOWS PHONE, 
http://www.windowsphone.com/en-us/how-to/wp8/settings-and-personalization/back-up-
my-stuff, archived at http://perma.cc/3P9H-RXNM (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).  Android 
users can download apps, such as inDefend, to back up their personal information.  See 
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example, a user that regularly receives company e-mail on their mobile 
device, but only periodically backs that device up to a computer or cloud, 
would have current e-mail easily collected from the device itself, but only 
out-of-date backups of files in special formats that would require a 
forensic analyst to translate.
95
 
 
   a.  Cloud-Based 
 
[32] The cloud could be one of the locations supplied by vendors of the 
device such as Apple’s iCloud,96 Google’s Drive, Microsoft’s SkyDrive; 
or the cloud could be a subscription service such as DropBox, LiveDrive, 
BlackBlaze Mozy, Amazon, etc.  These services are completely hosted by 
third-party companies each of which have processes that must be followed 
if anyone other than the user or the paired device wants to collect the 
hosted backups.
97
  
                                                                                                                         
inDefend Mobile Backup, GOOGLE, 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.dataresolve.android.security.backup&
hl=en, archived at https://perma.cc/GSQ7-SXNL (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).  Except 
using the Link function on a corporate Blackberry server, Blackberry does not backup e-
mail, contacts or calendars. See User Guide: BlackBerry Link for Windows 1.0, Back Up 
Your Device Data, BLACKBERRY, 
http://docs.blackberry.com/en/smartphone_users/deliverables/49304/lym1340633934452.
jsp, archived at http://perma.cc/X4XE-ZGPF (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 
95
 See Satish B., iPhone Forensics—Analysis of iOS 5 Backups: Part 1, INFOSEC INST. 
(May 3, 2012), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/ios-5-backups-part-1/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7N6N-9LQL. 
 
96
 See Thomas J. Trappler, When There’s a Third Party in the Cloud, COMPUTERWORLD 
(July 30, 2012, 10:42 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2505135/cloud-
computing/when-there-s-a-third-party-in-the-cloud.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/45KH-HD4D. 
 
97
 See, e.g., Back Up My Stuff, supra note 94; BlackBerry Business Cloud Services, 
BLACKBERRY, http://us.blackberry.com/enterprise/products/cloud-
services/overview.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DEP4-EJ6Z (last visited Mar. 6, 
2015); see also iCloud: iCloud Storage and Backup Overview, APPLE, 
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[33] Each of the major vendors, Apple, Google, RIM and Microsoft, 
have made provisions for complete or selective backups to be made to 
their cloud services through cellular or wireless network connections.
98
 
 
[34] As home consumer demand for large storage drives increased, and 
speeds for residential Internet went up, personal clouds solutions 
developed, which are generally supplied by hard drive manufacturers as a 
feature of a home network attached storage (NAS) drive.
99
  These 
solutions from Western Digital, LaCie, Seagate and others allow a central 
backup to be almost anywhere an Internet connection exists, and may 
create challenges for coordinating collections.  
 
b.  Dedicated Server, Application Host, or File 
Share 
 
[35] A dedicated server or share is similar to the personal cloud listed 
above, but with the key distinction of it being a company owned and 
managed server or share and likely only used for select applications such 
as Exchange, Evernote, a CRM or sales application or for centralized 
management of company owned devices.
100
  To further demonstrate the 
complexities in discussing this issue with prospective clients, a company 
may host their servers in the cloud (e.g., Rackspace or Amazon virtual 
servers), or may be using Cloud based private applications such as 
                                                                                                                         
https://support.apple.com/kb/PH12519?viewlocale=en_US&locale=en_US (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/BFB4-VBDA. 
 
98
 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 97.   
 
99
 See, e.g., Margaret Rouse, What Is Network-Attached Storage (NAS)?, SEARCH 
STORAGE (Aug. 2014), http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/definition/network-attached-
storage, archived at http://perma.cc/RN4Q-32YJ. 
  
100
 See, e.g., Margaret Rouse, Dedicated Server Definition, TECHTARGET (Sept. 2005), 
http://searchsoa.techtarget.com/definition/dedicated-server, archived at 
http://perma.cc/BSX6-XR6D. 
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Office365 or Exchange Online.
101
  Unless an MDM is being used by a 
company to perform complete backups of mobile devices to one of these 
central servers, only select data would be available from these locations 
and typically would not include device only data such as call logs, text 
messages, local pictures or downloaded files.
102
 
 
    i.  Partner Computer or Device 
 
[36] A partner computer might be used to synchronize select 
information to a mobile device or even as a complete backup in the event 
of loss of the mobile device.  iTunes on a local PC or Mac is an example 
of a computer application that creates a partnership with an iPhone and 
allows a complete backup of the device to be stored on the computer.
103
  
An iTunes backup is the closest alternative to an actual logical collection 
from a physical iPhone.
104
  Although the information in iPhone backups is 
either encrypted or obfuscated in proprietary file formats and naming 
conventions,
105
 others companies like Microsoft or Google, store the 
                                                 
101
 See, e.g., Barney Beal, Public vs. Private Cloud Applications: Two Critical 
Differences, TECHTARGET (May 2012), 
http://searchcloudapplications.techtarget.com/feature/Public-vs-private-cloud-
applications-Two-critical-differences, archived at http://perma.cc/D6WB-S68S. 
 
102
 See Why Mobile Device Management, 2X, http://www.2x.com/mdm/why-mobile-
device-management/, archived at http://perma.cc/4824-7JSE (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 
103
 Satish B., Forensic Analysis of iPhone Backups, EXPLOIT DB, http://www.exploit-
db.com/wp-content/themes/exploit/docs/19767.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/39FT-
EPLV (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
 
104
 See Bader & Baggili, iPhone 3GS Forensics: Logical Analysis Using Apple iTunes 
Backup Utility, 4 SMALL SCALE DIGITAL DEVICE FORENSICS J. 1 (2010), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.185.4439&rep=rep1&type=pdf
, archived at http://perma.cc/N4AS-J6DV. 
  
105
 See, e.g., Selena Ley, Processing iPhone / iPod Touch Backup Files on a Computer, 
THE APPLE EXAMINER, 
http://www.appleexaminer.com/iPhoneiPad/iPhoneBackup/iPhoneBackup.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/X7VK-HBRH (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
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backups of files in their original format and have industry standard .XML 
file formats for data such as call logs and text messages.
106
  
 
[37] Some devices can become partners of other mobile devices 
through peer-to-peer network and wireless connections such as 
Bluetooth
107
 and Near Field Communications (NFC).
108
  Peer devices can 
be either other smartphones, tablets or computers which might have data 
such as contacts, pictures or files, or they may be more passive devices 
with limited usage information.
109
   
 
[38] Regarding each of these locations above, it is important to note that 
only backed up data can be collected from synchronized device locations, 
and that volatile data (RAM) and information changed on the device since 
last synchronization will not be available.
110
  Further, some companies, 
                                                 
106
 See , e.g., FAQ about SMS Backup & Restore, ANDROIDSTUFF (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://android.riteshsahu.com/misc/faqs-about-sms-backup-restore, archived at 
http://perma.cc/UMR9-U477. 
 
107
 See, e.g., Fast Facts, BLUETOOTH SIG, INC., http://www.bluetooth.com/Pages/Fast-
Facts.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/B5JN-ANJE (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 
108
 See, e.g., NEAR FIELD COMMUNICATION, http://www.nearfieldcommunication.org, 
archived at http://perma.cc/EXM3-GT56 (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 
109
 Peer devices go beyond just passive ear pieces and are a growing market with the 
increase in ‘wearable’ technologies such as smart watches, fitness bands, health meters 
and even pain management devices and can be important in litigation due to their ability 
to either allow files to move from the device without traditional e-mail or text 
transmissions or for the data that they might supply.  See Sean Greene, Electronic 
Evidence Expert Witness: Will Fitbit and Crowdsourcing* Change Personal Injury 
Cases?, EVIDENCE SOLUTIONS, INC., http://www.evidencesolutions.com/web/Digital-
Evidence-Articles/fitbit-data-goes-to-court-electronic-evidence-expert.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z58Z-GQET (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 
110
 See RICK AYERS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STDS. & TECH., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 
GUIDELINES ON MOBILE DEVICE FORENSIC 3, 6 (Special Pub. 800-101, Rev. 1, May 
2014), available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
101r1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U7SV-DWU9. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                         Volume XXI, Issue 3 
 
28 
 
such as Apple, use special formats and mini-databases for the files stored 
as backups,
111
 while others such as Microsoft or Google store the backups 
of files in their original format and have industry standard .XML file 
formats for data such as call logs and text messages.
112
  
 
  3.  Physical Imaging/Full Forensic Copy 
 
[39] A forensic image is a bit-level copy of all data on a device in 
manner that represents the entire state of the device and could clone an 
exact duplicate with equivalent hardware.
113
  Physical imaging, performed 
while the device has maintained constant power-on and has been isolated 
from radio communications, can collect volatile memory, current state of 
running programs etc.
114
  Physical imaging is limited, as logical collection, 
to data that are on or in the physical device and memory cards.
115
  It 
should be highlighted that UICC (SIM) cards are a type of memory card 
like removable memory cards (SD & Micro SD) and need to be included 
in the collection plan.
116
  
                                                 
111
 See, e.g., Selena Ley, Processing iPhone / iPod Touch Backup Files on a Computer, 
THE APPLE EXAMINER, 
http://www.appleexaminer.com/iPhoneiPad/iPhoneBackup/iPhoneBackup.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/K3KW-K3RH (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 
112
 See, e.g., FAQ about SMS Backup & Restore, ANDROIDSTUFF (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://android.riteshsahu.com/misc/faqs-about-sms-backup-restore, archived at 
http://perma.cc/TM2Y-YH8W. 
 
113
 What is Forensic Hard Drive Imaging, FORENSICON COMPUTER FORENSIC 
SPECIALISTS , http://www.forensicon.com/resources/articles/what-is-forensic-hard-drive-
imaging/, archived at http://perma.cc/3NUC-XM9T (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 
114
 Kristine Amari, Techniques and Tools for Recovering and Analyzing Data from 
Volatile Memory, SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room (Mar. 26, 2009), available at 
www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/techniques-tools-recovering-
analyzing-data-volatile-memory-33049, archived at http://perma.cc/5B8D-8EDK. 
 
115
 See RICK AYERS ET AL., supra note 110, at 46. 
 
116
 Id. at 7. 
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[40] The following table will highlight some of the differences in data 
that is available from each type of collection listed above.
117
  
 
Table 1.  
 
 
Synchronized 
location 
Logical 
Device 
Physical 
Image 
E-mail Messages Yes 
If stored on 
phone 
If stored on 
phone or in 
slack space 
Text Messages No Yes Yes 
Photos on Phone 
No, unless 
synced 
Yes Yes 
Photos uploaded to 
Web 
Yes No 
If in slack or 
temp space 
Voice, video and 
other Files on Phone 
No, unless 
synced 
Yes Yes 
Files uploaded to 
Web or Server 
Yes No 
If in slack or 
temp space 
Internet & Search 
History 
Depends if 
logged in. 
Yes Yes 
Contacts 
No, unless 
synced 
Yes Yes 
GPS information 
No, unless 
using GPS 
App like 
Garmin or 
MapMyRun 
If GPS 
enabled and 
used 
If GPS 
enabled and 
used 
Maps and navigation 
history 
No 
May be 
limited 
 
Yes 
                                                 
117
 See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. 
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Wi-Fi Information No 
Networks 
used, signal 
etc. 
Networks 
used, signal 
etc. 
Cell Tower 
information 
No 
May be 
limited 
Yes 
Call history 
See provider 
website 
Yes Yes 
Application 
information 
Depends on 
app and 
settings 
May be 
limited 
Yes 
 
[41] There are multiple ways to collect from mobile devices in a 
forensically sound manner, and there may be a need for more than one 
way even in a single case.  Forensic collection does not mean only 
imaging, and imaging does not mean collecting everything.
118
  Even the 
seemingly simple options that one would consider for traditional 
computers or servers quickly become very complex problems when we 
approach mobile systems.   
 
III.  COLLECTION AS PART OF A LARGER PROCESS 
 
[42] What we call ‘collecting’ from a mobile device is actually 
‘processing’119 and involves a series of steps that are part of an overall 
process of forensic handling
120
 that can be challenged if not handled 
properly.  There are many considerations in certain litigation such as 
authentication of the actual device (who was the actual user at a point in 
time), and whether the device is being collected pursuant to a warrant, 
                                                 
118
 Matthew Nelson, The Top 3 Forensic Data Collection Myths in eDiscovery, 
SYMANTEC EDISCOVERY BLOG (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/top-3-forensic-data-collection-myths-
ediscovery, archived at http://perma.cc/ZL5C-EC7L. 
 
119
 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 71. 
 
120
 See AYERS ET AL., supra note 110, at 2–3. 
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arrest or consent that go beyond the scope of this writing. 
 
[43] Before we can collect anything, we must identify not only what 
systems we need to collect from, but how those systems may interact with 
other systems and make preparations to secure and preserve the data.
121
  
By being constantly connected, mobile devices are constantly gathering 
data to internal and external locations.  A mobile device can store 
potentially relevant information on removable memory cards, SIM cards, 
and internal volatile and non-volatile memory.
122
  When certain mobile 
devices such as the Blackberry go into a ‘locked’ state, volatile memory is 
wiped by the device automatically.
123
  Additionally, certain methods of 
unlocking a locked mobile device may require a restart of that device 
causing certain information to be changed or volatile memory to be 
cleared.
124
  If a device is not protected, incoming calls, text messages, e-
mails or application notifications could still change the state of the device 
even without any malicious intent.
125
 
                                                 
121
 See MURUGIAH SOUPPAYA & KAREN SCARFONE, NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-124 
REVISION 1: GUIDELINES FOR MANAGING THE SECURITY OF MOBILE DEVICES IN THE 
ENTERPRISE 5–6 (2013), available at 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-124r1.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FF9G-B38U. 
 
122
 See AYERS ET AL., supra 110, at 6–8, 10–11. 
 
123
 Any Way to Prevent Device Wipe after Failed password Attempts in BB10?, 
CRACKBERRY (May 22, 2013), http://forums.crackberry.com/blackberry-z10-f254/any-
way-prevent-device-wipe-after-failed-password-attempts-bb10-810021/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z9TV-L3U4. 
 
124
 Ensure Mobile Device Security, 2X MDM, http://www.2x.com/mdm/mobile-device-
security/, archived at http://perma.cc/V489-LJ2W (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 
125
 Jason Gonzalez & James Hung, Stroz Friedberg LLC, Mobile Device Forensics: A 
Brave New World?, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS, 
http://www.strozfriedberg.com/files/Publication/224ca0f8-5101-4e1b-938a-
4d4b128ad5ed/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ef4a28ad-ff7d-4014-aea8-
80505789b86c/Mobile%20Device%20Forensics_%20A%20Brave%20New%20World.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/ZR43-D9RF (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
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[44] Several very significant issues must be considered when 
approaching the collection of mobile devices: 
 
 • Ownership of the device, 
• Expected cooperation of the owner and/or user (which may 
not be the same person or entity), 
 • Synchronized peer devices, 
• Remote access/management and control to the device, 
 • Technologies and versions, and 
 • Nature of litigation.126 
[45] Ownership of the device can complicate matters due to the 
potential for restricted access such as pin codes, encryption, locks, and 
overall permission.
127
  In many instances where a company maintains 
ownership of the device or has established clear policies regarding 
cooperation by employees with shared use devices this may not be an 
issue, and even passwords, passcodes, pin codes, or encryption keys may 
be easily obtained.
128
 
  
[46] As individuals become more aware of and sensitive to the amount 
of data that their mobile devices contain, they are employing more 
methods of securing the data and devices through PIN codes, and other 
encryption.
129
  Whether this is a personal choice, or one imposed by 
corporate policy, the reality is that a majority of users do use some method 
                                                 
126
 See Michael Arnold, Collecting Data from Mobile Devices, ABA, 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills/110113-tips-collecting-
data-mobile-device.html, archived at http://perma.cc/EK2D-U27L (last visited Mar. 3, 
2015). 
 
127
 See, e.g., id. 
 
128
 See, e.g., id. 
 
129
 Mobile Devices, STAY SMART ONLINE, 
http://www.staysmartonline.gov.au/mobile_devices, archived at http://perma.cc/QW37-
DKCC (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
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to protect the data on their device.
130
  These methods can create 
challenges, delay, or—in some circumstances—prevent inspection and 
collection of a mobile device.
131
  Collection tools such as Cellebrite and 
Oxygen support decryption, though an uncooperative or unavailable user 
could limit collection options if advanced encryption is used with next 
generation devices such as the ‘black phone’ or Apple and Google’s most 
recent operating systems features.
132
  It is yet to be seen how the courts 
will ultimately see matters when someone asserts her right to privacy.
133
  
 
[47] Cooperative owners and users significantly reduce risk related to 
intentional or unintentional loss of data due to delay or external 
intervention.  Sometimes the owner and a user may not be the same 
entity,
134
 and there could be a conflict where technologies or policies were 
not centrally managed by the company,
135
 or if the user feels that the risks 
                                                 
130
 See, e.g., Donna Tapellini, Smart Phone Thefts Rose to 3.1 Million Last Year, 
Consumer Reports Finds, CONSUMER REPS. (May 28, 2014, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/04/smart-phone-thefts-rose-to-3-1-
million-last-year/index.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/RA4M-J7HP. 
 
131
 See AYERS ET AL., supra 110, at 43. 
 
132
 See, e.g., James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the 
Brookings Inst. (Oct. 16, 2014), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-
dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HGK5-UPMV. 
 
133
 See Andy Greenberg, Google and Apple Won’t Unlock Your Phone, But a Court Can 
Make You Do It, WIRED (Sept. 22, 2014 6:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/09/google-apple-wont-unlock-phone-court-can-make/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4L8Y-MVDZ. 
 
134
 See, e.g., Ex-Lawyer Tells Goffer Jury He Traded 3Com Merger Tips for Cash, 
BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-
19/goffer-trial-witness-says-he-traded-merger-tips-for-cash-filled-envelopes.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/C4AG-S3WR. 
 
135
 Id. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                         Volume XXI, Issue 3 
 
34 
 
associated with lack of cooperation are more favorable than the discovery 
of information on the mobile device.
136
  
 
[48] Synchronized devices are not limited to just a computer that may 
periodically back up the device, but may include any device that can 
remotely change the data on the device even after it is taken into 
custody.
137
  A typical smartphone or tablet will have multiple programs 
running on it that communicate over a number of networks such as 
cellular, wireless (Wi-Fi), Bluetooth, and low-frequency near field 
communications.
138
  Through any of these methods, or through remote 
access or control, data can be altered or even completely removed from a 
device if not secured properly.
139
 
 
[49] The type of device, its operating system, features, and 
characteristics can have a significant impact not only on how collection 
may need to be performed, but also on the steps for preservation at time of 
securing the device.
140
  Apple, Samsung, Microsoft, and Blackberry are 
some of the major players in the mobile device marketspace; however, 
                                                 
136
 See, e.g., Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of Raj Rajaratnam, United States v. Raj 
Rajaratnam, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21062, at 59 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2011), available at 
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-
governance/criminal/rajaratnam/Sentencing-Memorandum-on-Behalf-of-Raj-Rajaratnam-
US-v-Rajaratnam-S1-09-CR-1184-SD-NY-August-9-2011.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZKA7-D5F7. 
 
137
 See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 126.   
 
138
 Gonzalez, supra note 125.  
 
139
 See, e.g., Rene Millman, Smartphones & Tablets Remotely Wiped in UK Police 
Custody, ITPRO (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.itpro.co.uk/security/23273/smartphones-
tablets-remotely-wiped-in-uk-police-custody, archived at http://perma.cc/4TE6-TVKH; 
Jane Wakefield, Devices Being Remotely Wiped in Police Custody, BBC NEWS (Oct. 9, 
2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29464889, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RZS6-29KX. 
 
140
 See Arnold, supra note 126. 
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Google, HP, LG, and others have ‘smart’ mobile devices with different 
operating systems, operating system versions, features, power sources, and 
connectors.
141
  Sometimes the simplest design feature such an easily 
removable battery
142
 can impact the timing of the preservation of data or 
accessing simple information like serial numbers.
143
 
 
[50] It should also be mentioned here that security tools and 
applications must constantly be adapted to account for the constantly 
changing and ever expanding market of mobile devices.
144
  The skills for 
preserving, inspecting, collecting and interpreting mobile data must 
constantly be honed and even the results of tested tools must be validated 
and confirmed to maintain the most accurate and defensible presentation 
of data.
145
 
 
[51] The nature of the litigation or cause for collection is very important 
and should be a starting point for considering how one may need to 
approach a collection, and even then everything may not align in your 
favor. 
 
                                                 
141
 See, e.g., Jessica Dolcourt, Best Phones of 2015, CNET (Feb. 20, 2015, 11:16 AM), 
http://www.cnet.com/topics/phones/best-phones/, archived at http://perma.cc/KR96-
B6PH; see also Thomas Halleck, Google Planning Two Nexus Smartphones for 2015: 
Rumor Pegs LG For New Nexus 6 (Mar. 2, 2015, 7:53 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/google-planning-two-nexus-smartphones-2015-rumor-pegs-lg-
new-nexus-6-1833718, archived at http://perma.cc/87EN-RUWD. 
 
142
 See, e.g., How to Remove the Battery from an iPhone, WIKIHOW, 
http://www.wikihow.com/Remove-the-Battery-from-an-iPhone, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7BED-EHFA (last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (noting nine steps are needed to 
remove the iPhone 5 battery). 
  
143
 See AYERS ET AL., supra note 110, at 41. 
 
144
 See SOUPPAYA & SCARFONE, supra note 121, at 12. 
 
145
 See Murphy, supra note 71, at 9. 
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[52] For typical commercial litigation, where the information sought is 
related to typical business documents, communications (e.g., e-mail and 
text messages) and data from managed applications, and the device is 
managed by a corporate MDM system and policy, collection may be 
somewhat simplified.
146
 
 
[53] Collection gets more complicated in criminal and certain civil 
litigation where the use of the mobile device is itself part of the issue, or 
where specific and detailed analysis of the behaviors of a user or actions 
need to be performed.
147
 
 
[54] Collection may be merited, even when not specifically requested or 
implicated, in an effort to provide context or justification.  For example, in 
a personal injury claim where a litigant is seeking damages for future loss 
of ability and fitness, tracking applications could provide historical 
evidence of actual activities or a decline since injury.
148
 
 
 A.  Challenges and Complications 
 
[55] In some cases, it may be enough to perform a forensically sound 
logical collection of select targeted information.  Sometimes these 
collections may not even involve the actual mobile device when a reliable 
current backup or synchronized source of data is available.
149
 
 
                                                 
146
 See, e.g., CDW, MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT:  NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE 4 (2012), 
available at http://webobjects.cdw.com/webobjects/media/pdf/108281-WP-Mobile-
Device-Mgt.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KHT6-D8TK; see also Arnold, supra note 
126.   
 
147
 See Arnold, supra note 126.  
 
148
 See Parmy Olsen, Fitbit Data Now Being Used In The Courtroom, FORBES (Nov. 11, 
2014, 4:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/11/16/fitbit-data-court-
room-personal-injury-claim/, archived at http://perma.cc/MFG8-CCVV. 
 
149
 See Arnold, supra note 126. 
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[56] In both criminal and many civil cases today, mobile data and even 
just the evidence of use of a mobile device may be important and may 
necessitate a more comprehensive evaluation of devices and sources 
outside of the primary device.
150
  Criminals are becoming more tech-
savvy, with many learning how to hide, encrypt, and even destroy their 
data on demand.
151
 
 
  1.  Cooperation and Privacy 
 
[57] Of course, complications will arise even in simple cases when the 
user is not cooperative, cannot locate the device, or is subject to other 
governing privacy regulations such as EU Directive 94/46/EC which, in 
short, is founded on seven basic principles: 
 
•  Notice: subjects whose data is being collected should be 
given notice of such collection. 
•  Purpose: data collected should be used only for stated 
purpose(s) and for other purpose. 
•  Consent: personal data should not be disclosed or shared 
with third parties without consent from its subject(s). 
•  Security: once collected, personal data should be kept safe 
and secure from potential abuse, theft, or loss. 
•  Disclosure: subjects whose personal data is being collected 
should be informed as to the party or parties collecting such 
data. 
•  Access: subjects should granted access to their personal 
data and allowed to correct any inaccuracies. 
•  Accountability: subjects should be able to hold personal 
data collectors accountable for adhering to all seven of 
                                                 
150
 See id. 
 
151
 See Tim Crushing, DOJ Whines That A Warrant To Search A Mobile Phone Makes It 
More Difficult To Catch Criminals, TECHDIRT (Apr. 24, 2014, 12:48 PM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140423/15081827008/government-argues-that-
warrant-requirement-cell-phone-searches-does-nothing-keep-cops-catching-bad-
guys.shtml, archived at https://perma.cc/8UDA-EXDY. 
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these principles.
152
     
 
2.  Ownership Challenges 
 
[58] Even with cooperative users or companies, there can be 
complications when the two are not one and the same, and there are 
differing viewpoints. 
 
[59] In 2013, Gartner predicted that by 2017 one half of employers will 
require employees to supply their own device.
153
  At the moment, thirty-
eight percent of employees in mature markets—such as the US—like to 
use a single device for both work and personal use,
154
 and as much as 46% 
of companies either ignore or are not aware of the use of personal devices 
for business use.
155
  The convenience of using a personal device for both 
personal and business purposes becomes a problem when users are told 
that they need to give up their personal device and allow it to be inspected 
and potentially collected in whole as an image vs. targeted collections.
156
 
                                                 
152
 See Protection of personal data, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Apr. 9, 2014), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/, archived at http://perma.cc/VG4A-RDF9. 
 
153
 See Press Release, Gartner, Inc., Gartner Predicts by 2017, Half of Employers will 
Require Employees to Supply Their Own Device for Work Purposes (May 1, 2013), 
available at http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2466615, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZV7K-RAYY. 
 
154
 See Brian Proffitt, Worried Workers: BYOD Or You’re SOL [Infographic], 
READWRITE (Dec. 6, 2012), http://readwrite.com/2012/12/06/pause-economy-linked-to-
bring-your-own-device-use, archived at http://perma.cc/Q7X3-RYY9. 
 
155
 See id.; see also Businesses Unprepared to Support New Mobile Ways of Working, 
CITRIX (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.citrix.com/news/announcements/nov-
2011/businesses-unprepared-to-support-new-mobile-ways-of-working.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7AHJ-ARDP. 
 
156
 Haman Allen & David Herman, Challenges of Mobile Devices, BYOD and 
EDiscovery, LAW TECHNOLOGY TODAY (Sept. 19, 2014), 
http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2014/09/challenges-of-mobile-devices-byod-and-
ediscovery/, archived at http://perma.cc/4HPP-MDHY. 
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  3.  Resources 
 
[60] The actors who preserve, collect, and review mobile device data 
are very similar to those who work with connected computing devices. 
However, their skillsets may be very different, and there is an increased 
importance in the handling and timing of events.  Turning mobile devices 
off does not ensure that data does not get changed, and introduces the 
potential that pin codes or other authentication may be triggered when 
turned back on.
157
  For example, first responders need to be specially 
equipped and trained to handle the mobile devices initially.
158
  Improperly 
secured or handled devices could potentially be remotely turned back on, 
wiped, reloaded, or have data altered through synchronization.
159
 
 
[61] Properly trained forensic experts and first responders must be 
prepared with the skills and tools to act quickly and effectively, whether 
through the use of radio shielding solutions like a Faraday container to 
prevent external influence, creating a clone UICC card (e.g. SIM, USIM, 
RUIM or CSIM) without the ability to communicate with a cellular 
network, disabling wireless, or preserving the usable state of the device.
160
  
Observations and inquiry must be performed early in the securing of a 
mobile device.
161
  If a mobile device is unlocked and undamaged, has 
sufficient power or the owner is willing and able to supply any 
authentication codes, a logical collection might be possible quickly and 
                                                 
157
 See Gonzalez, supra note 125. 
 
158
 See AYERS ET AL., supra note 110, at 27. 
 
159
 See Arnold, supra note 126. 
 
160
 See AYERS ET AL., supra note 110, at 29. 
 
161
 See Jill Griset & Melissa Laws, Navigating A Case Through E-discovery, MCGUIRE 
WOODS LLP 2 (2012), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-
resources/publications/navigating-e-discovery.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C4A7-
LBW8. 
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without additional costs.
162
  When devices have authentication codes that 
are unknown, encryption is enabled or the device is physically damaged, 
costs and time for collection can go up substantially even for a device with 
limited in-device memory.
163
 
 
[62] Problematically, there may be a backlog to qualified data 
extraction facilities or engineers, which can result in the loss or destruction 
of data through delays before collection.
164
 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
[63] Mobile data is unavoidable in modern discovery and will continue 
to play an increasingly significant role in litigation.  Beyond the devices 
that are the subject of this discussion, the market experiences new 
innovations almost daily, including new “wearable” technology and the 
Internet of Things, all of which will be sources of potentially relevant 
information under the right circumstances.
165
  
 
[64] Attorneys must be prepared to assess and evaluate each new source 
of information based on the capabilities of the technology and the needs of 
the case.  The legal standard will remain constant: reasonableness given 
the issues at stake in the litigation.  But this is merely the starting point for 
the legal decisions about collection, which must be informed by the cost 
                                                 
162
 See AYERS ET AL., supra note 110, at 35–37; DIGITAL MOUNTAIN, INC, TAKING THE 
FIRST STEP—DATA PRESERVATION 2 (2009), available at 
http://digitalmountain.com/fullaccess/Article5.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S77J-
UEXF. 
 
163
 See Arnold, supra note 126. 
 
164
 See Millman, supra note 90.  
 
165
 See Ted Samson, How Wearable Tech Will Fuel The Internet of Things, INFOWORLD 
(June 5, 2013), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2614798/mobile-technology/how-
wearable-tech-will-fuel-the-internet-of-things.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3DBN-
CWHY. 
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and complexity of the activity balanced against the need for the 
information at issue.  Whatever the collection method, it is important to 
document each step and every decision in the process to defend against 
potential challenges.   
